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Introduction 
1. Agriculture is a key sector in the Kenyan economy, employing about 70 
percent of the population, earning one-half of the foreign exchange, provid-
ing food for a rapidly growing population and supplying industrial inputs. 
The recent stagnation of Kenyan agriculture has caused policymakers to ask 
questions about the adequacy of the incentives for investment in agriculture. 
The rate of growth in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has slowed to 3.1 percent 
annually since 1972 while the rate of population growth has accelerated from 
about 3.5 percent to nearly 4 percent in this same period; this raises funda-
mental questions about the future productive capacity of Kenyan agriculture, 
especially when one considers that gross fixed capital formation in agriculture 
has declined in real terms in recent years. In order to meet the Government's 
targets for food production and agricultural exports in the coming years, in-
centives for agricultural investments, both for intensification of seasonal 
crop production and longer-term capital formation for agricultural development, 
need to be increased. 
2. While policymakers have focused much attention to the issue of how finan-
cial market policies affect the performance of credit schemes, little attention 
has been given to the issue of how the incentives for investment may affect the 
performance of a credit scheme even though the latter may be equally as impor-
tant in affecting the performance of a credit scheme. Profitability is central 
to the performance of credit schemes because profitability (rate of return to 
investment) affects income and thus repayment capacity of the borrower as well 
as expected income and willingness to borrow in the future. Since the profit-
ability of agricultural investments affects income, this also strongly inf1u-
- 2 -
ences the amount of money rural residents have to deposit in financial insti-
tutions. In this way, profitability indirectly influences the amount borrowed 
and the amount deposited both of which have obvious implications for economies 
of scale in financial institutions. Various economic policies affect the pro-
fitability of agricultural investments. These policies include those which 
influence the prices received by farmers for agricultural outputs, those poli-
cies that influence the prices paid by farmers for purchased inputs, and those 
policies that influence farm yields. The effect of these policies on the in-
centives for investment in agriculture will be addressed in the next section of 
this report. 
Agricultural Price Policy 
3. Agricultural price policy in developing countries is often based on a com-
promise between forces that argue for domestic self-sufficiency and hence high 
prices for food products and those that argue for low prices to stimulate in-
dustrial processing of raw materials and to provide low cost food for urban, 
industrial workers. Such a compromise often tends to emphasize the level of 
nominal prices rather than "real" prices (that is, to adjust nominal prices for 
inflation), and this becomes particularly serious in an inflationary setting 
1/ 
where prices are adjusted with a lag.- What appears to be high nominal prices 
in an inflationary economy can quickly become low real prices that offer no 
incentive to increase production or investment in agriculture. In an attempt 
to compensate agriculture for the resulting low output prices, government ere-
dit policies typically focus on preferential low interest rates and fail to 
recognize that credit is fungible and cannot easily be tied to particular activ-
!/In the present paper, nominal prices will be adjusted for inflation using 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) deflator. 
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ities. Moreover, in an inflationary setting such interest rate policies dis-
courage banks from maintaining the real volume of agricultural lending while 
providing substantial income transfers to a relatively few credit recipients. 
4. Several government institutions play a major role in Kenyan agricultural 
price policy. Overall, prices of most agricultural products are determined 
by the government through various parastatal marketing boards or other price 
control policies while the prices of a few products are primarily determined 
by supply and demand in a competitive market. It is important to note that 
these institutions and policies were originally intended to benefit the farm-
ers, yet the realized outcome many years later has generally been to penalize 
the farmer by adversely affecting the prices and the profitability of agricul-
tural investments. Among the foodcrops, the government has a monopoly estab-
lished by law and held by the National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB) for 
maize, wheat, and rice which controls the marketing of these products and sets 
producer prices, retail prices and milling margins. An incentive price for 
edible beans is set by NCPB, but prices are largely determined by domestic 
supply and demand. The prices of other food crops such as fruits and vege-
tables are also market determined. For the industrial crops, the prices o~ 
oilseeds are market determined b~t the prices of sugarcane and cotton at the 
producer and consumer levels as well as the processing margins are controlled 
by the government. The Cotton Lint and Seed Marketing Board (CLSMB) has a 
monopoly on cotton marketing and the Kenya National Trading Corporation (KNTC) 
controls sugar distribution to wholesalers and retailers. Of the three export 
crops, the prices of two (coffee and tea) are determined by the world market 
price and prices of the third (pyrethrum) are set by the Government. The 
Pyrethrum Marketing Board has a monopoly on marketing and exports. The Kenya 
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Tea Development Authority (KTDA) markets all small holder tea (about 60 per-
cent of total production), while the estates are responsible for processing 
and marketing their own tea. The Kenya Planters Cooperative Union (KPCU} has 
a monopoly on all cooperative and estate coffee processing and marketing under 
authority granted by the Coffee Marketing Board. Of the livestock products, 
beef prices are determined by supply and demand in the domestic market with 
retail prices set by the Government but only enforced for the lowest grades. 
The Kenya Meat Commission (KMC) has a monopoly on meat exports. Milk prices 
at the producer and consumer level as well as the processing margins are con-
trolled by the government. The Kenya Cooperative Creameries (KCC) collects, 
processes, and markets about 60 percent of total production and the remainder 
is sold by small producers directly to consumers. The prices of poultry, pork, 
lamb, and goats are not controlled by the Government. 
Terms of Trade 
5. One aggregate indicator of the profitability of agricultural investments 
is the trend in the agricultural sector terms of trade which is a ratio of the 
index of prices received for farm products relative to the index of prices 
paid for purchased inputs and consumer goods in rural areas. The terms of 
trade declined by about 12 percent from 1972 to 1975 because prices of inputs, 
especially petroleum and petroleum related products, increased faster than farm 
output prices (Table 1). During the next two years (1975-1977), farm output 
prices, mainly coffee and tea, increased so rapidly that the term of trade 
reached their highest level of the 1970s. Since that peak, the terms of trade 
for agriculture have declined steadily, reaching a new low of 80 in 1982 
(Table 2). This means that farmers have suffered a 20 percent decline in the 
purchasing power of the products they sell compared to the products they buy 
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since the year 1976. This decline has been caused by a doubling of the index 
of prices paid since 1976 due in part to the effect of exchange rate devalua-
tions in September of 1981 and November of 1982 on the cost of purchased inputs 
which are generally imported or made from imported raw materials. 
6. Even though the government also has price controls on purchased farm in-
puts, the inflation in input prices for the most part cannot be controlled be-
cause Kenya is a price taker on the world market for these imported inputs. 
Consequently, the input price controls can only attempt to regulate the domes-
tic marketing and transportation charges. In contrast to the doubling of the 
input price index, the index of agricultural output prices increased by only 
60 percent from 1976 to 1982 (Table 2). Prices of livestock and livestock 
products which are free of government price controls have increased the most 
since 1976, and prices of the export crops (coffee, tea and Pyrethrum) have 
increased the least due to the worldwide recession that has caused price de-
clines in many export products. The above trends in the term of trade indi-
cate that agricultural purchasing power has declined since 1976 and that pro-
fitability has declined, thereby reducing the incentive for investment in ag-
riculture. 
7. A second aggregate indicator of th~ profitability of agricultural invest-
ments is the sectoral terms of trade between agriculture and other sectors of 
the economy. As indicated in Table 3, the terms of trade for agriculture rela-
tive to manufacturing have declined by 6 percent since 1976 but have fluctu-
ated from a high of 20 percent above the 1976 base to 29 percent below the 
1976 base in 1979. Thus, agriculture has not only experienced declining pro-
fitability relative to manufacturing but also more variability in that profit-
ability. If one examines the terms of trade for agriculture relative to the 
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rest of the domestic economy (GDP minus agriculture)~ a similar picture emerges. 
That is, the terms of trade have declined indicating a general loss of incen-
tives to invest in agriculture compared to other sectors of the economy. 
8. A more disaggregated indicator of the profitability of agricultural invest-
ments is useful to determine whether the general decline in terms of trade and 
profitability noted above applies throughout the agricultural sector or whether 
the prices and profitability of some farm products have increased while others 
have decreased. For the products shown in Table 4, the nominal average gross 
commodity prices to farmers for all 12 farm products have increased steadily 
throughout the 1972-1982 period. However, it is difficult to determine whether 
these price increases represent simply general price inflation of the Kenyan 
economy or real price increases caused by changes in the supply and demand for 
a product. For this reason, Table 5 shows the deflated average gross commodity 
prices to farmers (nominal prices adjusted for inflation using the consumer 
price index) for these same products during the 1972-1982 period. The results 
indicate that while the deflated prices of all 12 products increased during 
this period, large year-to-year fluctuations occurred for some products. The 
deflated prices of coffee, tea and sisal increased substantially from 1975 to 
1977, reached their highest level in 1977, znd then declined substantially from 
1978 through 1982. Pyrethrum prices declined until 1975, then increased to a 
peak in 1980 and have declined since that time. Seed cotton prices increased 
steadily until 1978 and have since declined. Like coffee and tea prices, the 
deflated prices of maize also increased from 1972 to 1977 and then declined 
through 1982; however~ unlike the large year-to-year fluctuation of coffee and 
tea prices, maize prices changed by relatively small amounts from one year to 
another. The deflated prices of sugar cane increased steadily to a peak in 
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1977, declined through 1981, and then increased in 1982 to about the 1977 
level. The deflated prices of paddy rice increased steadily to a peak in 
1976 and have declined substantially since that time. The deflated prices 
of the last four products (wheat, beef, bacon, and milk) all have similar 
price movements which are different from the other 8 products. The deflated 
prices to farmers of wheat, beef, bacon, and milk have increased steadily dur-
ing the 1972-1982 period and are currently at the highest level of the period. 
9. Several interesting points need to be made about the behavior of the de-
flated prices of these 12 products. First, the export products of coffee and 
tea whose prices depend to a large extent on world markets, are the products 
with the greatest price fluctuations and therefore the highest risk and vari-
ability of return on investment. Profitability is not only higher than that 
for the other commodities but also much more variable. Even though pyrethrum 
is also an export products, prices and profitability have been more stable and 
probably lower than those for coffee and tea, because of the Government's 
greater efforts to control the farm price. Second, the food crops of maize, 
wheat and rice all have NCPB controlled prices which exhibit more price sta-
bility than the export crops. Deflated maize prices have increased less than 
the pr±ces of an~ other product and may reflect the Government's interest in 
holding down the price of one of the staples of the Kenyan diet. Deflated 
wheat prices have increased more than those for maize due to the Government's 
interest in promoting domestic production to substitute for wheat imports. 
Third, deflated prices of the livestock products, especially beef and bacon, 
reached their highest levels in 1982. Since the prices of these products are 
free of government controls, the increasing prices and profitability of beef 
and bacon reflect changing domestic demand and supply conditions. Milk prices 
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which are subject to government price controls have increased but have not kept 
pace with the price increases of beef and bacon which are not subject to govern-
ment price controls. Fourth, the deflated prices of those products witb market 
determined prices such as coffee, tea, beef, and bacon have enjoyed more favor-
able price movements and greater profitability than the deflated prices of those 
products subject to government price controls such as maize and wheat. Thus, 
government price controls in conjunction with the parastatal marketing boards 
have adversely affected the prices and profitability of some farm products, re-
ducing the incentives to increase production and investment. 
Farm Yields 
10. In addition to the influence of the prices of outputs and the prices of 
inputs on profit~bility, one must consider policies that influence farm yield. 
While it is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate government po11cy 
toward research to develop improved crop varieties and livestock breeds~ an 
examination of maize and wheat yields indicates an increasing trend from 1970 
to 1982 (Table 6). Wheat yields have increased faster than maize yields during 
this period but the yields of both vary considerably from year to year because 
of weather uncertainty, changing levels of input use, and area planted. When 
compared to other countries, the average maize yield in Kenya of 1.89 metric 
tons per hectare is low; less than 30 percent of the average U.S. yield and 
about 50 percent of the maize yield in developing countries such as Argentina 
and Thailand. Wheat which is produced almost entirely on larger, commercial 
farms has yields that compare more favorably (about 60 percent of U.S. yield) 
to those in the U.S. Maize yields in Kenya are only about 25 percent higher 
than the wheat yields; this is significantly lower than in the U.S. where maize 
yields are approximately three times the wheat yield which indicates that more 
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needs to be done to improve maize yields in Kenya. These data indicate that 
increasing yields have had a favorable impact on maize and wheat profitability 
although it is clear that much more needs to be done to improve the overall 
level of yields and to reduce the variability of yields both of which would 
contribute to reduced risk and higher profitability. 
Estimated Farm Costs and Returns 
11. Despite the increase in average maize and wheat yields noted in the 1970 
to 1982 period, estimates of the costs and returns indicate that production of 
either crop is unprofitable for the average producer. Based on Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) estimated costs and returns from wheat production on large 
commercial farms which produce nearly all the wheat, wheat production is only 
profitable at yields of 30 or more bags of 90 kg. per hectare (Table 7). At 
this yield level wheat production has a positive gross margin that pays a 
small return to the land and management factors of production after deducting 
all the variable costs of production plus an interest charge. However, only 
the good farmer can achieve that yield level in wheat production. For the 
large majority of farmers who obtain average yields (between 15 and 22 bags 
per hectare) wheat production was not a profitable enterprise in 1982. The 
MOA estimated costs and returns for large commercial m~ize production indicate 
that maize was just as unprofitable as wheat for the average farmer. The maize 
farmer must obtain yields of 60 or more bags of 90 kg. per hectare to earn a 
positive gross margin after deducting all the variable costs of production plus 
an interest charge. This yield level is nearly three times the average maize 
yield of 22 bags of 90 kg. per hectare in 1982. One may argue that production 
costs on large commercial maize farms are not the appropriate measure since 
most maize is produced on small commercial farms and even subsistence farms 
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that rely primarily on family labor in the production process. Even on small 
commercial farms the maize yield must exceed 33 bags of 90 kg. per hectare, 
~hich is 50 percent above the 1982 average maize yield to earn a positive gross 
margin after deducting all the variable costs of production plus an interest 
charge. The above data indicate that maize and wheat production is unprofit-
able for farmers who only obtain average yields; higher yields and/or prices 
are needed to improve the incentives for producers to invest more and produce 
more in these enterprises. 
12. Gross margins for the products with market determined prices such as the 
export crops of coffee and tea or local food products such as tomatoes and 
bacon are much higher than those for the price controlled products such as 
maize, wheat and dairy (Table 8). Tea, tomatoes and bacon all have high posi-
tive gross margins while coffee has a lower gross margin and dairy (also a 
price controlled product) has a negative gross margin. Because of these 
higher gross margins, the incentives to invest and expand production appear 
to be much stronger for the export crops or the domestic products which are 
not subject to government price controls, than for maize or wheat. Although 
the returns are much higher for some of these products, farmers may still 
prefer maize production because the mai~e is needed for howe consumption and 
because the price and yield variability is much less than that for tomatoes 
or bacon. 
13. When analyzing estimated costs and returns, it is important to bear in 
mind a number of problems associated with farm budget studies wherever they 
have been conducted. The Ministry of Agriculture Farm Management Branch de-
velops estimates of the farm cost/price situation for a wide range of farm 
products to present a comprehensive picture of the profitability of agricul-
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ture. This cost of production information serves a variety of uses in agri-
cultural planning, international trade, pricing policy, agricultural lending, 
and agricultural extension. The costs and returns are estimated from the re-
sults of about 200 record keeping farms, special farm surveys, research data, 
and MOA extension personnel. The Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC) uses 
the MOA production costs studies together with its own information to develop 
production cost estimates for use as a guideline by loan officers in loan pre-
paration and appraisal. These production cost studies have methodological pro-
blems as well as data problems. Since each farm has a unique cost structure, 
the methodological problems include deciding whether to select the marginal, 
average or above average farm, the region of the country to represent, the 
level of technology to use, the level of management to use, the production 
costs to include, and the rate at which to depreciate the productive assets. 
The main data problems are those of reliability of the input and output prices 
used, the technical coefficients of the production process and on-farm con-
sumption. The MOA and AFC production cost estimates contain many of these 
deficiencies. The cost estimates are biased toward the better farms, the 
higher potential areas of the country, and the higher levels of technology and 
management. The present estimates do not accurately represent the costs and 
returns on the large number of small family farms in Kenyan agriculture. The 
production cost estimates may also fail to accurately represent input and out-
put prices because the official government controlled prices are used rather 
than the prices actually paid by farmers for inputs and prices actually re-
ceived by farmers for outputs. This use of official prices leads to an under-
estimate of the price of inputs and an overestimate of the price received for 
outputs. 
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14. Because of major problems in the marketing and input supply sectors that 
adversely affect the farm-gate prices of inputs and outputs, the incentives to 
invest in agriculture are greatly reduced. Due to the frequent shortages of 
critical inputs, high distribution costs and transportation costs of farmers, 
actual farm-gate prices of inputs are often substantially higher than official 
prices at an input supply store. Much of the higher cost is caused by the small 
quantities that most family farmers buy and the long travel distances from farm 
to market. In addition, MOA research has shown that late arrival of critical 
inputs such as maize seed and fertilizer by 3 weeks after the start of the rains 
will cause a 50 percent decrease in the additional maize yield from the ferti-
lizer application. Such a decrease in the expected return from fertilizer may 
cause a knowledgeable farmer to stop investing in fertilizer due to the input 
supply problems. Similarly, the marketing problems greatly increase the cost 
and risk of agricultural production. Prices received for the crop often fall 
substantially below the official prices due to high transport costs and late 
payments for the delivered crop. Payment delays of as much as six months after 
farmer del~very of the crop to the NCPB are a critical problem for maize and 
wheat producers as well as for producers of other agricultural products deliv-
ered to any of the parastatal or monopoly marketing organizations. Although 
these represent only a few of the many marketing and input supply problems, 
they serve to illustrate not only the magnitude of the problem but also the 
inter-relationship of these factors with agricultural credit and the implica-
tions for the effective use of credit. The problems of the New Seasonal Credit 
Scheme (NSCS), to be discussed later in this report, cannot be solved without 
also solving the marketing and input supply problems. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations 
15. The inadequacy of the incentives for investment in Kenyan agriculture as 
measured by t~e declining terms of trade raise fundamental issues of whether 
the prospects for future growth in production and productivity will keep pace 
with a rapidly growing domestic and export demand for food products. Because 
agricultural output prices have not increased as fast as purchased input prices 
since 1976, the purchasing power and profitability have declined by about 20 
percent. 
16. During the 1972-1982 period, the nominal and deflated prices of export 
crops and livestock products free of price controls increased faster than the 
prices of domestic food crops subject to price controls. The profitability 
and incentives to invest appear much greater in the export crops and domestic 
products free of government price controls than for price controlled products. 
17. The farm production cost estimates of MOA and AFC demonstrate that maize 
and wheat production is not profitable for the large majority of farmers who 
obtain average yields. Furthermore, the yield levels that do show a profit 
can only be achieved by a small percentage of the maize and wheat farmers. 
Profitability and the incentives to invest are much higher among the export 
crops of coffee and tea and food products such as bacon and tomatoes where 
prices are free of government controls than for maize and wheat. 
18. The problems of the parastatal marketing boards and input supply further 
reduce the incentives for investment in agriculture because their many ineffi-
ciencies increase the cost and risk of using purchased inputs as well as reduce 
the return on the sale of the output. 
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Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Table 1 
Price and Terms of Trade Indices for Agriculture, 1973-1977 
Index of Index of Prices Agricultural Sector 
Year Prices Received Paid Terms of Trade 
1972 = 100 
1973 111 115 96 
1974 129 142 91 
1975 145 165 88 
1976 216 178 121 
1977 310 205 152 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Survey, 1978 
KENYA 
AGRICULTURAL CREDIT REVIEW 
PRICE ~TI TERMS OF TRADE !~~ICES FOR AGRICULTURE, 1977-1982 
1976=100 
1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Prices Received-
Total Crops 119.5 119.1 116.4 122.3 129.7 138.0 
Domestic 112.5 116.1 115.9 130.7 141.3 147.8 
Export 153.3 120.0 116.8 117.4 112.3 134.6 
Livestock and Products 123.4 129.3 135.6 140.6 151.2 166.7 
Weighted Average of Above 120.1 121.0 120.0 126.2 134.4 145.0 
General index of agricultural output prices. - 119.2 123.1 133.1 145.8 159.5 
Prices Paid-
Purchased Inputs 114.4 119.3 124.5 137.9 153.3 182.1 
Index of Purchased Consumer Goods-
Rural Areas 107.8 117.0 130.1 146.1 169.9 205.5 
INDEX OF PRICES PAID 109.4 117.6 128.7 144.1 165.8 199.7 
Agricultural Sector Terms of Trade 109.8 101.4 95.6 92.4 87.9 80.0 
-
1-3 
Ill 
0"' 
....... 
(D 
Source: Central Bureau of Stat~tics, Economic Survey, 1983. N 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Sectoral Terms of Trade, 1976-81 
(1976 = 100) 
1976 1977 1978 
GDP 1/ Deflators-
(1) Agriculture 100 130 119 
(2) Manufacturing 100 108 117 
(3) Building and Construction 100 109 121 
(4) Trade and Hotels 100 115 121 
(5) Transport and Communication 100 107 124 
(a) GDP, minus (1) 100 111 121 
(b) GDP, minus (2) 100 120 120 
(c) GDP, minus (3) 100 119 120 
(d) GDP, minus (4) 100 119 120 
(e) GDP, minus (5) 100 119 120 
Terms of Trade 
Agriculture 
(1) . (2) 100 120 102 
(1) 7 (a) 100 108 98 
Manufacturing 
(2) .;. (1) 100 83 98 
(2) .;. (b) 100 90 98 
Building and Construction 
(3) 7 (c) 100 92 101 
Trade and Hotels 
(4) .;. (d) 100 97 101 
(TransEort and Communication 
(5) .;. (e) 100 90 103 
!/Monetary economy only. 
Source: Economic Survey, 1981-82 
Table 3 
1979 1980 1981 
123 132 143 
174 140 153 
141 161 171 
129 143 164 
131 137 151 
129 143 159 
119 139 154 
126 138 153 
127 138 152 
127 138 154 
71 94 94 
95 92 90 
142 106 107 
146 101 99 
112 117 112 
102 104 108 
103 99 98 
Item 
Coffee (100 Kg.) 
Tea (100 Kg.) 
Sisal (100 Kg.) 
Pyrethrum Extract (100 Kg.) 
Seed Cotton (100 Kg.) 
Maize (100 Kg.) 
Sugar Cane (1 Ton) 
Rice Paddy (100 Kg.) 
Wheat (100 Kg.) 
Beef (Third Grade) (100 Kg.) 
Bacon (100 Kg.) 
Milk (100 Liters) 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Nominal Average Gross Commodity Prices to Farmers 
1972-1982 
(K.SH. Per Stated Unit) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 
779 921 1008 1069 2524 3975 2818 
601 593 721 808 1057 2149 1583 
90 191 443 323 234 398 272 
396 415 430 447 492 559 720 
115 122 155 192 209 288 315 
39 39 46 70 77 89 89 
50 52 62 89 105 127 133 
51 50 59 104 137 136 145 
51 57 80 105 120 133 133 
302 346 413 474 479 519 676 
418 426 567 636 655 684 764 
77 77 77 85 105 132 132 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Economic Surveys 
1979 1980 
2815 2634 
1357 1591 
361 414 
1006 1200 
328 331 
77 95 
133 1,33 
151 151 
144 164 
689 795 
778 859 
132 146 
1981 
2258 
1774 
412 
1150 
341 
100 
1,45 
150 
167 
960 
975 
186 
1982 
2780 
1941 
503 
1150 
352 
107 
170 
150 
188 
1100 
1373 
215 
1-'.l 
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Date 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
Average 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Average Yield of Maize and Wheat 1970-1982 
Average Yield in 
Metric Tons Eer Hectare Percent 
Maize Wheat Maize 
1. 60 1.43 
2.08 1.48 30.0 
1. 76 1. 54 -15.4 
1. 66 1.59 - 5.7 
1.85 1. 60 11.4 
2.06 1.49 11.4 
2.05 1. 52 - 0.5 
2.08 1.33 1.5 
1. 99 1. 37 - 4.4 
1. 68 1.18 -15.6 
1.68 1.85 0.0 
2.12 1. 98 26.2 
1. 97 N.A. - 7.1 
1.89 1.53 2.6 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture 
Table 6 
Change in Yield 
'Wheat 
3.4 
4.0 
3.2 
0.6 
- 6.9 
2.0 
-12.5 
3.0 
-13.9 
56.8 
7.0 
,N.A. 
4.2 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Estimated Gross Margins From 
Wheat and Corn on Large Commercial Farms in 1982 
WHEAT M A I Z E 
Yield Level Bags of 90 kg/ha 15 22 30 30 45 
Kshs -
Gross Output 2,925 4,290 5,850 4,286 6,428 
Total Variable Costs 3,858 4,169 4,528 4,857 5, 987 
Gross Margin 933 121 1,322 - 571 441 
Interest @ 12% 441 462 486 468 566 
Gross Margin 
-1,374 - 341 836 -1,039 - 125 Including Interest 
Table 7 
60 
8,571 
7,226 
1,345 
700 
645 
a/See Appendix Tables 1 and 2 for a detailed explanation of these cost 
and return estimates. 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Costs of Inputs, Prices of Agricultural 
Produce and Costs of Production 
Table 8 
Kenya 
Agricultural Credit Review 
Estimated Gross Margins From Coffee, Tomatoes and Baconer in 1982a/ 
Coffe~ Tea£./ Tomatoes Baconer~/ Dair~/ 
- - - - Kshs - - - -
Gross Output/Ha 20,000 66,300 40,000 22,280 6,090 
Total Variable Costs 16,145 20,239 6,680 14,358 6,072 
Gross Margin 3,855 46,061 33,320 7,922 718 
Interest @ 12% 1,937 2,428 802 1,722 728 
Gross Margin 1,918 43,633 32,518 6,200 710 Including interest 
a/ 
- See Appendix Tables 3 and 4 for a detailed explanation of these cost 
and return estimates. 
b/Average of the first four years 
E/After the first year 
E:./Per sow 
~/Per dairy cow 
Source: Agricultural Finance Corporation, Farm Management Guideline 
